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O
n September 29, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, or the
Commission) issued a report on the Implications of the Growth of Hedge
Funds (SEC 2003). The report raised several concerns related to hedge funds and
proposed a number of regulatory initiatives that the SEC might take. Its principal rec-
ommendation was that most hedge managers (advisers) be required to register with
the SEC as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act (IAA) of 1940, as
amended. On July 14, 2004, after a lengthy period of public comment on the report,
the SEC adopted (by a three to two vote) Rule 203(b)(3)-2, requiring the registration
of most hedge fund advisers by February 1, 2006.
The Commission’s rationale for adopting Rule 203(b)(3)-2 was that SEC regis-
tration of advisers was necessary to protect “investors in hedge funds, and to enhance
the Commission’s ability to protect our nation’s securities markets” (SEC 2004b).
Pursuant to its investor protection mandate, the SEC cited two concerns: the growing
incidence of fraudulent activity by hedge fund advisers and the increasing “retailization”
of hedge funds. Requiring hedge fund advisers to register, the Commission argued,
would deter fraudulent conduct by providing the SEC with better information about
the activities of hedge fund advisers, by giving the SEC the authority to conduct on-site
examinations of hedge fund advisers, and by fostering a standard of conduct and an
environment of compliance that would serve to better protect hedge fund investors.
The Rule 203(b)(3)-2 initiative is not the first time the SEC has expressed con-
cern about the activities of hedge funds. More than thirty years ago, in 1969, the SEC
instituted an investigation of the use of leverage and short selling by hedge funds
(SEC 1969, 18). In 1972 it conducted a study of the use of hedge funds by institutional
investors (SEC 1972, xv). In 1992 the Commission provided Congress with an analy-
sis of the regulatory treatment of hedge funds under the federal securities laws. And
in 1999, in the wake of the September 1998 near collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management Inc. (LTCM) and the intervention of the Federal Reserve in arranging a
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creditor bailout of LTCM, the Commission, along with other government agencies,
participated in the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, which examined
the potential impact of hedge funds on the stability of financial markets (President’s
Working Group on Financial Markets 1999).
The concerns about hedge funds manifested by these regulatory initiatives can be
grouped under two general public policy issues: financial stability and investor pro-
tection. Specifically, are the activities of hedge funds a threat to financial stability (or do
hedge funds pose a systemic risk)? And, second, are the legal or regulatory protections
for hedge fund investors adequate? The focus of this paper is on the second issue:
investor protection regulation. The discussion first considers the conceptual role of
investor protection regulation: What are its goals and likely costs and benefits? The
following sections describe alternative regulatory approaches to investor protection
and the current regulatory structure under which hedge funds operate in the United
States. A discussion follows of the new regulatory requirements associated with SEC
registration of hedge fund advisers and the purpose of these requirements. The next
sections examine the SEC’s concern about the “retailization” of hedge funds and dis-
cuss the role of registered hedge funds and particularly funds of hedge funds (FoFs).
The final sections examine the implications of increased investments in hedge funds
by institutional investors such as pension funds and provide my key conclusions and
suggestions for future regulatory initiatives.
Social Calculus of Investor Protection
In an ideal world all investors would have free access to all investment products and
would have the right to decide for themselves which products to buy or which pro-
vided them with the best combinations of risk and return. Investors would make
investment decisions taking into account their current and expected income, their
current portfolio of assets and obligations, and their own tolerance for risk. In response,
asset providers would provide an array of investment products that satisfied the
needs of all investors. In this world investors would be solely responsible for their own
miscalculations and for whatever bad luck they might encounter related to their
investment decisions.
In the real world, of course, things are more complicated. Not all investors have
the same information and are equally capable of knowing how to evaluate whatever
information they do have, and not all vendors of investment products are honest and
straightforward in their dealings with investors. Further, product providers typically
know more about the products they offer than do consumers of that product, and
providers often have an economic incentive not to communicate all of their informa-
tion to consumers. And even if providers do wish to communicate all of their information
fully, doing this credibly can sometimes be difficult.
These real-world complexities—information asymmetries, potential conflicts of
interest, and disparate investor capabilities—are well understood by many investors,
particularly more financially sophisticated ones, but are clearly not understood by all
retail investors. A common solution for these market complexities is the intermedi-
ation of professional investment advisers, whom investors can retain to represent
their interests and to advise them about the most appropriate investments for them.
These advisers can be expected to know more about the investment products being
offered than their investor-clients and should therefore be better able to protect their
clients’ interests. Alternatively, less knowledgeable investors can place their money
with professional fund managers, who can make the appropriate investment deci-
sions for them.
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asymmetries and disparities of investor sophistication, and they may create addi-
tional information problems. Investment advisers, while knowing more than many
investors, are still unlikely to know as much as product providers. They also are likely
to be more motivated to sell their own products than to protect the long-run inter-
ests of their clients (even recognizing the potential loss of “reputational capital” of
not doing so). The solution of imposing legal liability on advisers and fund managers
for inappropriate recommendations or investment decisions (such as suitability
requirements) does not fully solve the
problem because of the difficulty of draft-
ing and enforcing effective and practicable
legal standards.
Thus, in the real world governments
and regulators are left to decide how to deal
with these market complexities, or how to
balance the perceived costs of doing nothing to protect investors against the perceived
benefits of proactive intervention to protect them. Government intervention itself is
costly. Direct administrative and bureaucratic costs are associated with regulation,
compliance, market rigidities due to regulatory barriers or prohibitions, distortions of
economic incentives as market participants “game” the regulations, and, possibly, polit-
ical costs as various private interest groups vie with one another to capture regulators
and shape the regulatory agenda. Also, a potentially large cost of investor protection
regulation is that it may preclude a certain class of investors from participating in
certain investment products, relegating all members of this class to less desirable
investment products.
Hedge funds are an example. Unencumbered by regulatory restrictions on short
selling, leverage, and fee arrangements and by liquidity requirements and portfolio
distributions constraints, hedge funds can use trading strategies not typically avail-
able to retail investors, relegating these investors largely to investment products pro-
vided by mutual funds. As a result, hedge funds may be able to provide investors with
better downside protection against precipitous falls in asset (stock) prices, such as
occurred in early 2000, than are mutual funds, which typically hold long equity or
bond positions and cash. Thus, blocking retail investor access to hedge funds may
impose significant costs on the excluded investors by forcing them into inferior
investment products, which must be balanced against the potential benefits of pro-
tecting investors against losses they might incur if they were to invest in hedge funds.
1
The difficulty of quantifying these competing considerations has resulted in different
countries reaching different conclusions about how best to balance these interests.
But in almost all countries the issue has been resolved in favor of regulation to pro-
tect some, if not all, retail investors, although not always in the same way. Implicitly,
most countries have judged that the social costs associated with real-world market
complexities (or imperfections) are greater than the costs of regulatory intervention,
or, put another way, that the potential benefits of regulation are greater than the
potential costs. Not everyone can be expected to agree with this social calculus, and
some will argue that all government decisions are driven only by the political power
of special-interest groups rather than considerations of social or economic welfare.
But for purposes of this paper I accept that some investor protection regulation will
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1. For a discussion of the investment performance of hedge funds, see Edwards and Gaon (2003); for
a comprehensive survey of past research on hedge fund performance, see Naik and Aggarwal (2005).
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always be an integral component of retail investment markets in most countries and
that the more relevant question is how best to shape investor protection regulation.
Alternative Investor Protection Regimes
Investor protection regulatory regimes in most countries can be described as either
“top down” or “bottom up.” A top-down regime is characterized by the requirement
that investment products or schemes be authorized together with rules about what
that scheme can and cannot do. For example, the regulation of investment companies
(mutual funds) in the United States is primarily a top-down structure. Mutual funds
must register under the Investment Company Act (ICA) of 1940 and must adhere
to detailed SEC regulations with respect to custodial requirements, liquidity and
diversification portfolio requirements, restrictions on leveraging and short selling,
management fee arrangements, redemption requirements, disclosure and report-
ing requirements, and so forth. The primary purpose of these regulations is both to
better inform investors and to protect them by limiting exposure to financial loss.
The regulatory regimes for listing and authorization of investment funds in the
United Kingdom are predominately top-down, as is much European legislation gov-
erning investment funds.
2
In contrast, a bottom-up regulatory regime is basically a disclosure-based regime.
Greater reliance is placed on rules that require investment product providers to
accurately describe the nature of these investment products and their potential risks.
Armed with this information, investors are given much more responsibility to assess
the risks and to determine whether the investments are suitable for them. Fundamental
to this scheme is an acceptance on the part of both regulators and investors that
some investment products will fail and that some investors will experience significant
financial losses, perhaps even their entire investments. Australia’s regulatory scheme
for mutual funds is an example of this approach. As a result, in Australia a very wide
range of retail funds exists, including hedge funds and other exotic funds, such as
raptor funds that invest in ostrich farms.
U.S. Regulation of Hedge Funds
In the United States the regulation of hedge funds might be best characterized as a
patchwork of exemptions from various investor protection laws rather than a
thoughtfully crafted top-down or bottom-up regulatory scheme. The United States nei-
ther requires government authorization of hedge funds nor restricts what hedge funds
are able to do, nor does it mandate that hedge funds and hedge fund advisers (prior to
this year) make specific disclosures to investors. But to gain these exemptions hedge
funds must restrict their clients to investors who meet certain threshold wealth or
income requirements. Qualifying investors are given unlimited access to hedge funds
with virtually no regulatory protections, while low-wealth or low-income investors are
entirely excluded from participating in any kind of hedge fund investment.
Thus, in the United States we have, perhaps unwittingly, separated hedge fund
investors into two distinct classes: retail (investors who do not meet the threshold
wealth requirements for exemption) and wholesale (investors who do meet the
threshold wealth requirements). Exactly where the legal threshold levels of wealth
and income are set determines which investors are retail and which are wholesale.
These legal thresholds, it should be noted, are not specific to hedge funds and were
established years ago, when hedge funds were not part of the financial landscape.
Rather, their purpose was to determine the disclosure obligations applicable to issuers
in public versus private securities and the scope of mutual fund regulation.
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to a variety of legal restrictions and regulations unless they are organized in a way
that exempts them from these regulations, specifically from the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts, the ICA, and the IAA. Hedge funds are exempt from the Securities Act
of 1933 if they obtain their investors through private placements rather than a public
offering. This exemption hinges on meeting the requirements of section 4(2) or
Regulation D of the 1933 act; it usually means restricting the fund’s investors to
“accredited” investors. If hedge funds fail to meet this test, they would have to file a
registration statement under the 1933 act, which would require that extensive infor-
mation be disclosed and would create liability for material misstatements or omissions.
3
Accredited investors are individuals who have incomes of at least $200,000 in
each of the two most recent years, who have a joint income with a spouse in excess
of $300,000 in each of those years (and who have a reasonable expectation of reach-
ing the same income level in the current year), or who have a net worth, or joint net
worth with a spouse, that exceeds $1 million at the time of purchase. Institutional
investors with assets in excess of $5 million, banks, savings and loan associations,
broker/dealers, insurance companies, investment companies, and small business
investment companies licensed by the U.S. Small Business Administration are also
accredited investors. The rationale for limiting investor access to private placements
to accredited investors is that such investors can be assumed to be both informed
and sophisticated enough not to need the protections afforded to other investors
under the federal securities laws.
Hedge funds typically exempt out of the 1934 Securities Act by limiting their
investors to fewer than 500. If a fund has more than $10 million and 500 investors, its
securities would have to be registered with the SEC under the 1934 act, and it would
become a “reporting” company. This classification would mean providing investors
with extensive disclosure: annual reports (Form 10-K), quarterly reports (Form 10-Q),
and so on.
Most hedge funds also exempt out of the ICA, which regulates mutual funds, by
relying on the exceptions in either section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the act. Under 3(c)(1),
the act does not apply to an investment pool (or hedge fund) that does not obtain its
investors through a public offering (and is therefore exempt from the 1933 Securities
Act) and has fewer than 100 persons or legal entities (investors). Under section
3(c)(7), a hedge fund is exempt from the act if it has only investors who meet the
criterion of qualified purchasers—individuals or companies who have at least $5 mil-
lion in investments. The qualified-purchaser threshold is considerably higher than
the accredited-investor threshold.
4
If a hedge fund were not to exempt out of the ICA, it would have to file as a “reg-
istered investment company” under the act and would become subject to numerous
top-down regulations governing its portfolio holdings, leverage, short selling, mar-
keting, governance, and conflict-of-interest and disclosure rules. Because of the
nature of most hedge funds’ investment strategies, such registration would most likely
take the form of a closed-end fund, relieving the fund of the same reporting and
redemption requirements imposed on open-end mutual funds.
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2. For an overview, see the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and a council directive of the
European Commission (1985), as amended.
3. While Rule 506 of the 1933 act does allow them to have as many as thirty-five “nonaccredited”
investors, most hedge funds find it is not worthwhile to involve themselves with such investors.
4. See the ICA, sec. 2(1)(51), and SEC Rule 2a 51-1.
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As exempt investment pools, hedge funds can trade any type of security or finan-
cial instrument, operate in any market anywhere in the world, make unlimited use of
derivatives instruments, engage in unrestricted short selling, employ unlimited amounts
of leverage, hold concentrated positions in any security without restriction, set their
own redemption policies without restriction, and use whatever fee structure seems
most productive to compensate their managers or advisers. Nor are exempt pools
required to make extensive disclosures to investors or regulators. Thus, limits or
restrictions on hedge funds’ activities are determined not by regulation but primarily
by the contractual relationships they have with their investors and by market discipline
exerted by the creditors, counterparties,
and investors with whom they transact.
In February 2006 the SEC adopted
Rule 203(b)(3)-2, which introduced a top-
down approach to regulating the activities
of hedge funds by requiring SEC registra-
tion of most hedge fund advisers. The rule’s
intent is to provide greater protection for hedge fund investors through enhanced
disclosure and increased regulatory oversight of the activities of hedge fund advisers.
5
Until this year advisers to hedge funds did not have to register under the IAA
because they typically met the private-adviser exemption. Specifically, if they had
fewer than fifteen clients in the past twelve months and did not hold themselves out
to the public as an investment adviser or act as an investment adviser to a registered
investment company or business development company, they were not required to
register (Rule 203[b][3]). Under previous SEC rules each separate company (hedge
fund, investment partnership, managed account, etc.) that the adviser managed was
considered a single client for purposes of registration if the adviser based its advice
to the company on the company’s investment objectives as opposed to the investment
objectives of the company’s individual owners.
Rule 203(b)(3)-2 changes this definition of “client” and by doing so effectively
requires all hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC (except those with no more
than $25 million under management or whose funds require a “lockup” longer than
two years.)
6 This rule change was accomplished by introducing a “look-through”
provision that requires each owner (investor) of a private fund to be counted as a
client. Under the new rule, an adviser to a single hedge fund with fifteen or more
clients (investors) must register under the IAA. Further, Rule 203(b)(3)-2(k) requires
advisers to hedge funds in which registered investment companies (mutual funds)
invest to count all investors in those mutual funds as clients and to look through
the top fund in a fund-of-fund structure and count as clients all investors in the
portfolio hedge funds.
To limit the reach of Rule 203(b)(3)-2 to advisers of hedge funds, however, the
Commission defines a hedge fund for purposes of registration to be a company or fund
that (1) would be subject to regulation under the ICA but for the exceptions provided
by either section 3(c)(1) or section 3(c)(7) of the act; (2) permits its investors to
redeem their interests in the fund within two years of purchasing them (that is, have
less than a two-year lockup); and (3) is offered with investment strategies that are
based on the skills, ability, or expertise of the investment adviser. This definition is
intended to exclude advisers to many other business organizations, such as insurance
companies, broker-dealers, and banks, as well as advisers to private equity funds and
venture capital funds that typically require lockup periods longer than two years.
While the SEC acknowledges that private funds such as private equity and venture
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 
In the United States we have, perhaps
unwittingly, separated hedge fund
investors into two distinct classes: 
retail and wholesale.capital funds are very similar to hedge funds, it defends its definition on the grounds
that it has not encountered significant enforcement problems with advisers to such
funds, in contrast to its experience with hedge fund advisers.
The import of requiring hedge fund advisers to register under the IAA is that they
become subject to much the same rules that apply to advisers to mutual funds (reg-
istered investment companies). Specifically, hedge fund advisers are subject to exam-
ination by the SEC, conflict-of-interest and antifraud rules, additional disclosure
requirements, and limitations on the use of performance fees (Section 205[a][1]).
However, if all of the advisers’ clients are qualified clients (have a net worth of more
than $1.5 million or $750,000 invested with the adviser), registered advisers can employ
an asymmetric fee structure.
7 Because almost all hedge fund advisers will want to
use asymmetrical performance-based fee structures, an indirect effect of Rule
203(b)(3)-2 is to raise the minimum net worth requirement for 3(c)(1) hedge funds
to that of the qualified client standard from the prior accredited investor standard
(net worth of $1 million or annual income of more than $200,000).
8
What Will Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Accomplish?
While a comprehensive description of the many regulatory requirements that accom-
pany adviser registration is beyond the scope of this paper, a description of a few key
requirements may provide a flavor of the nature of these regulations. Registered
hedge fund advisers must complete the Uniform Application for Investment Adviser
Registration (or Form ADV) under Rule 204-3. Part I of the ADV requires information
about the adviser’s business location, ownership structure, basic operations, and past
disciplinary events. Part II requires information about the adviser’s fees, investment
style, potential conflicts of interest, brokerage practices, affiliations with other securities
professionals, education and business background, and other information relevant to
a client’s decision to hire the adviser. Part I is made available on the Internet. Part II
must be provided to clients and is, in effect, a mandated disclosure document. Unless
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5. In the absence of SEC registration, hedge fund advisers are still subject to antifraud provisions of
both federal securities laws and state antifraud rules, such as New York’s Martin Act, as well as to
insider trading laws. Eliot Spitzer used the Martin Act to successfully prosecute widespread mutual
fund fraud during the last few years, long before the SEC acted against these abuses. 
6. This lockup exemption is intended to exempt advisers to private equity funds and venture capital
funds from registration. 
7. In the absence of this exception, performance-based fee structures for mutual fund advisers must
be fulcrum fees that move in both directions equally, as opposed to the asymmetric fees that are
common in hedge funds (for example, 20 percent of net returns above some “hurdle rate”).
8. Many hedge funds also are regulated by the Commodities Future Trading Commission as “com-
modity pool operators” (CPOs) because they invest in or trade one or more futures or options
contracts on a regulated commodity exchange. The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) subjects CPOs
and their advisers (CTAs) to regulation but not the commodity pools themselves. Once registered,
CPOs and CTAs must comply with the rules of the National Futures Association (NFA), avoid conflicts
of interest and protect customer funds, provide written disclosure to prospective investors of
the risks of investing in commodity interests, adhere to restrictions on advertising, satisfy record-
keeping and reporting requirements, and be subject to periodic inspections of their activities by
the NFA. In addition, advisers to hedge funds are subject to common law remedies for fraud, as
well as claims for fraudulent manipulation under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Act of 1934. Typically, prior to investing in a hedge fund in a private placement, investors are given
for review and agreement an offering memorandum and partnership agreement. These documents
provide investors with information about the potential risks associated with the fund and serve as a
notice of caveat emptor. They also form the basis for possible contractual law and fraud remedies
available to investors. 
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the adviser utilizes a qualified custodian, it must send quarterly account statements
to clients, deliver an audited balance sheet with Form ADV Part II, and undergo an
annual surprise audit by an independent certified public accountant (CPA).
Additional disclosure is required for registered advisers if they experience an
impaired financial situation (if advisers’ financial condition is “reasonably likely to impair
the ability of the adviser to meet contractual commitments to clients” or if any legal or
disciplinary events occur that are material to an evaluation of the advisers’ integrity or
ability to meet contractual commitments to clients (Rule 206[4]-4). Further, Section 207
of the IAA makes it unlawful for a registered investment adviser to willfully make an
untrue statement of a material fact, or to willfully omit to state such a material fact, in
any registration application or report filed with the SEC.
Registration carries significant record-keeping requirements for advisers. For
example, advisers must keep copies of all disclosure documents given to clients or
prospective clients and the dates that each disclosure was given or offered; retain
performance data and supporting calculations and work papers related to the per-
formance data used; retain client transaction records (securities purchased, sold, the
date, amount, price) and client securities position listings; retain client suitability
documentation, such as basic information on the client; and maintain performance
records for the five-year period from the date last used. Additional record-keeping
requirements apply to insider trading policies and reportable securities transactions
by so-called access persons.
Finally, if hedge fund advisers meet the test of “having custody of client assets,”
as many will do, they will have to maintain client funds and securities with a qualified
custodian, such as a bank or registered broker-dealer. The qualified custodian is
required to deliver account statements (on at least a quarterly basis) directly to the
client to ensure the integrity of the statement and enable the client to identify any
erroneous or unauthorized transactions or withdrawals by the adviser. If an adviser
does retain a qualified custodian, it does not have to send quarterly statements to
clients or undergo an annual surprise examination by an independent CPA to verify
the funds and securities of the clients.
9
The obvious thrust of Rule 203(3)-2 is to provide greater protection for hedge
fund investors against fraudulent activities by hedge fund advisers. Little in the new
disclosure requirements will assist hedge fund investors in evaluating the nature of
the hedge fund investments or the risks associated with those investment strategies.
Thus, Rule 203(3)-2 will not assist investors in evaluating the likely performance of
a particular hedge fund investment strategy or in comparing that investment with
alternative investment products.
Critics of Rule 203(3)-2 argue that registration of hedge fund advisers is unlikely
to provide effective protection against fraud. But even assuming that there will be
some reduction in fraud losses to hedge fund clients, critics contend that the costs
(direct and indirect) associated with registration are likely to be considerably greater
than the benefits of greater protection for hedge fund investors, who are consider-
ably wealthier and more financially literate than the average mutual fund investor.
The costs associated with increased regulation include added SEC costs and compli-
ance costs to hedge funds that will be passed on to investors, reducing their returns.
Critics also find little reason to believe that there are significant negative externalities
(or social costs) associated with private investment losses incurred by wholesale
hedge fund investors.
10 Such losses are unlikely to undermine confidence in financial
markets generally or result in contagion effects that undermine other financial insti-
tutions. Finally, Rule 203(3)-2 will shut out more investors from hedge fund invest-
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to that of the qualified-client standard, arguably relegating them to inferior invest-
ment vehicles.
The Retailization of Hedge Funds
In supporting Rule 203(3)-2 the SEC expressed concern about the growth of what it
termed the retailization of hedge funds—the increasing ability of less qualified (or
retail) investors to access hedge fund investments. It pointed to three ways that this
increased access was happening (SEC 2004a).
First, the wealth thresholds that restrict investor access to hedge funds, such as
the accredited investor standard applicable to 3(c)(1) hedge funds, have been eroded
over time by a general rise in income and wealth levels. For example, a recent report
indicated that the number of American households with a net worth of $1 million or
more, excluding their principal residence, grew from 5.2 million in 2002 to 8.9 million
in 2005 (Johnston 2006). If principal residence were not excluded this number would
be two or three times greater. Thus, a far larger segment of the investing public is prob-
ably now able to meet the $1 million accredited-investor standard necessary to access
hedge funds than when this standard was established. The issue, however, is whether
someone with $1 million today is less financially sophisticated than in the past, which
is not obvious. But it is possible that more unsophisticated investors are able to partic-
ipate in hedge fund investments than in prior years and that this participation may have
contributed to the growing fraud problem that the SEC has observed. (The underlying
assumption, of course, is that a reasonably close positive correlation exists between an
individual’s financial wealth and his or her financial sophistication.)
11
Whatever the truth about this relationship, the adoption of Rule 203(3)-(2) indi-
rectly redresses this concern by in effect raising the minimum wealth threshold for
3(c)(1) hedge fund investors to that of the qualified-client standard. Specifically,
because most hedge fund managers will want to use an asymmetric performance-
based fee structure, the minimum wealth standard for individual investors for 3(c)(1)
funds will now be a net worth of at least $1.5 million rather than the $200,000 annual
income or $1 million net worth thresholds under the accredited-investor standard.
12
Second, there has been a proliferation of funds of hedge funds (FoFs), which has
arguably made hedge fund investments more available to more retail investors
because FoFs typically have lower investment minimums for individuals. FoFs are
hedge funds that invest only in other hedge funds—the portfolio funds—or hold par-
ticipations (or are limited partners) in the portfolio hedge funds. The appeal of FoFs
to investors is diversification and professional management. FoFs provide diversifi-
cation benefits by investing in many different hedge funds, thereby diversifying across
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9. Registered hedge fund advisers, unlike mutual fund advisers, do not have to file quarterly reports
with the SEC listing all the securities they own, file semiannual reports to shareholders about
their operations, disclose how they vote their proxies, have a capital structure that allows only
one class of stock to be issued, or have a board with an independent chairman and a majority of
independent directors. 
10. SEC registration may result in a higher incidence of fraud if hedge fund investors become more
reckless in their choice of advisers because they believe SEC oversight now protects them against
such fraud. 
11. Recent episodes of fraud suggest that this premise may not be sound. See “NFL players sue a
hedge fund for fraud, theft” (2006).
12. 3(c)(7) hedge funds are not affected because the applicable net worth threshold is already above
the qualified-client threshold. 
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risks associated with different hedge fund investment strategies as well as protecting
against the possible fraudulent behavior of hedge fund advisers. In addition, FoF
managers arguably have greater expertise in identifying superior fund managers and
in monitoring their performance than do individual investors, and they may be better
positioned to detect and/or prevent fraudulent behavior on the part of advisers. As a
result, one would expect FoFs to outperform (at least before fees) a passively man-
aged index of diversified hedge fund strategies randomly selected.
These potential benefits do not come free. Investors in FoFs pay another layer of
fees to advisers of FoFs similar to what is typically paid to the advisers of the portfolio
funds. Specifically, FoF investors usually pay FoF managers an annual flat fee of 1 to
2 percent of assets and an incentive fee of, say, 20 percent of net returns above a
threshold level. These fees are in addition to the fees (which are similarly structured)
that the FoF pays to the advisers of each of its portfolio funds. The resulting total
fees are substantial and typically require FoFs to earn before-fee net annual returns
in excess of 40 percent before FoF investors can realize positive net returns. Despite
these fees, FoFs have grown rapidly in recent years.
Third, institutional investors have increased their participation in hedge funds.
While endowments and universities have long been active participants in hedge funds,
more recently pension funds have been increasing their investments in hedge
funds. This trend can be viewed as the indirect retailization of hedge funds because
more pension fund beneficiaries (or retail investors) are indirectly exposed to the
risks associated with hedge fund investments, possibly without any knowledge or
understanding of these risks. Underlying this concern is the implication that the
interests of pension fund managers and advisers may not always be aligned with the
interests of their beneficiaries, which may result in fund managers undertaking
investments that are inappropriate for fund beneficiaries (the principal-agent prob-
lem). Further, there is a veiled presumption that the governance structure of pension
funds and other institutional investors cannot be relied on to represent the interests
of fund beneficiaries.
Funds of Funds and Registered Hedge Funds
There are two types of FoFs: unregistered and registered. Unregistered FoFs are
similar to other hedge funds. They are subject to the exemptions from regulation dis-
cussed earlier and to the wealth thresholds that apply to investors in hedge funds
generally—the 3(c)(7) qualified-purchaser standard and the qualified-client standard
in effect since the adoption of Rule 203(b)(3)-2. Thus, unregistered FoFs generally
do not have retail investors and as such have not contributed to concern about the
retailization of hedge funds.
Registered FoFs may have retail investors.
13 These funds are registered under the
ICA, mostly as closed-end (mutual) funds but sometimes as open-end mutual funds,
and typically pursue an absolute-return investment strategy (such as long/short equity
or market neutral) similar to what unregistered FoFs might utilize. Open-end mutual
funds must honor all redemption requests immediately (or at least within seven days).
Closed-end funds, in contrast, do not issue redeemable securities and may or may not
have publicly traded shares; they may provide their shareholders with liquidity by
agreeing to purchase periodically their own shares at net asset value (so-called interval
funds). At year-end 2002 there were forty-two registered hedge funds, only thirteen
of which had registered their securities under the 1933 Securities Act.
An example is Oppenheimer Tremont’s Market Neutral Fund, which is a regis-
tered FoF. The fund pursues a typical FoF investment strategy, offers its securities
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provision is not necessary under the ICA, Oppenheimer Tremont requires its investors
to have a net worth of at least $1.5 million so that its advisers can utilize the standard
hedge fund (asymmetric) incentive fee structure (Rule 205-3).
Registered hedge funds are not a significant threat to the current regulatory scheme
for protecting retail investors. Neither closed-end nor open-end registered mutual
funds are an attractive vehicle through which to pursue most hedge fund investment
strategies. First, current regulations require mutual funds to hold substantial amounts
of liquid assets against possible redemption requests, even in the case of closed-end
interval funds. Because many hedge fund strategies entail holding substantial amounts
of illiquid assets, such a liquidity require-
ment makes it impossible to profitably pur-
sue these illiquid strategies.
Second, most hedge fund strategies
rely heavily on the use of leverage, which
is subject to cumbersome restrictions when
operating as a mutual fund. While the use
of leverage by closed-end funds is less restricted than for open-end funds, both types
of funds are limited in the amount of leverage they may use. Hedge funds are unre-
stricted in their use of leverage.
Third, most hedge fund strategies employ short selling, which is effectively limited
by mutual fund regulation. Although short selling is not prohibited per se under mutual
fund regulation, the requirement that mutual funds segregate cash and other liquid
securities to cover short positions effectively makes these assets nonproductive and
discourages short selling. Hedge funds have no deterrents to short selling.
Fourth, mutual fund regulation restricts the use of the standard performance-fee
structure used by hedge funds to align the interests of fund advisers and investors.
In particular, hedge funds typically compensate advisers based on the performance
of the fund’s portfolio (typically 20 percent of returns above a designated hurdle rate
or absolute return such as the Treasury bill rate) in order to provide an incentive for
them to produce positive returns in all kinds of market environments (even declin-
ing stock markets). In addition, hedge funds usually require advisers to invest their
own assets alongside their investors’ to ensure that they do not engage in excessively
high-risk strategies.
Thus, registration under the ICA is unlikely to attract a great number of hedge
funds because of regulatory restrictions that make it difficult for them to pursue most
hedge fund investment strategies. More generally, Congress and the SEC need to
reexamine these regulatory restrictions to determine whether they are still neces-
sary. Relaxing these restrictions would have two potential benefits: Hedge funds
would have a greater incentive to register under the ICA, and traditional mutual
funds would be able to provide absolute-return investment strategies in competition
with hedge funds. This change could provide retail investors with access to hedge
fund strategies under an acceptable regulatory structure.
The current regulatory structure is, in any case, probably unworkable. While reg-
istered FoFs and other hedge funds are subject to the ICA and IAA and to corre-
sponding SEC regulations, like mutual funds, it is not clear how current mutual
regulations can be effectively applied to registered hedge funds. A few examples may
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13. Investors in registered funds are not subject to the net-worth or income thresholds applicable to
investors in unregistered hedge funds.
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illustrate this point. First, although mutual funds are subject to substantial disclosure
requirements intended to make their investments and risk exposures transparent to
investors, the same disclosure requirements applied to hedge funds may not provide
much transparency about investment risks and returns. Registered FoFs will typically
not be able to disclose much about the investment strategies pursued by their port-
folio hedge funds other than what these funds do generally and the magnitude of the
FoFs’ own investments in each of the portfolio funds. Very little about the nature of
the risks associated with the underlying investment strategies of these funds is likely
to be revealed for proprietary reasons.
Second, the valuations of the FoFs’ portfolio assets and liabilities (or investments)
also are likely to be more challenging than for most mutual funds’ assets, which are
usually traded in liquid public markets. Hedge fund portfolios typically include illiq-
uid assets and complex derivatives trades that make asset valuation considerably more
difficult and inexact. The valuation process may also contain an inherent conflict of
interest because it is often done by hedge fund advisers themselves.
Third, while current mutual fund regulation effectively limits the use of leverage
and short selling by mutual funds, it is not clear how these restrictions would be
effective in limiting the use of leverage and short selling by the portfolio funds of reg-
istered FoFs. Unregistered portfolio hedge funds held by registered FoFs would pre-
sumably not be subject to these restrictions.
Fourth, the standard reporting requirements directed at mutual fund perfor-
mance may be inappropriate for registered FoFs as well as for other hedge funds and
may even mislead investors about the true nature of the returns and risks associated
with investments in these funds. For example, conventional performance measures
such as Sharpe ratios can be highly misleading when applied to hedge fund strategies
because of their use of conventional measures of return volatility (such as variance)
as a measure of risk. Such measures do not adequately capture the so-called fat-tail
risks implicit in many hedge fund strategies. Moreover, at present no consensus
exists about how to measure and report hedge fund performance so that investors
will be provided with a clear idea of the likely risks and returns associated with dif-
ferent hedge fund investment strategies (Financial Economists Roundtable 2005).
Thus, there needs to be an open discussion among regulators, industry representa-
tives, academics, and other policymakers about whether all current mutual fund regula-
tions are necessary and whether the same regulations can be effectively applied both to
mutual funds and to registered hedge funds. Potential benefits exist in allowing retail
investors greater access to hedge funds through registered FoFs. Hedge fund invest-
ment strategies provide greater diversification opportunities and may result in higher
risk-adjusted returns for investors.
14 For example, during the 2000–02 period, when
stock markets were in decline, hedge funds in general performed significantly better
than did stock and bond mutual funds.
15 Had retail investors been able to include in their
portfolios some hedge fund investments, they may have been able to avoid or mitigate
the substantial losses that most mutual funds investors incurred during this period.
16
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom has already
begun this process. It announced recently that it is considering allowing FoFs to
be marketed to retail investors under the same rules that govern mutual funds.
Clive Briault, FSA managing director for retail markets, said, “Given the reality of
the contemporary retail market, it seems sensible to permit the marketing of funds
of hedge funds through authorized, onshore vehicles. These onshore funds of
funds would benefit from the protections already in place for authorized funds”
(“Hedge funds for the masses” 2006).
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Another concern has been the growth of investments in hedge funds by institutional
investments, particularly by both private and public pension funds. This concern cen-
ters on whether pension fund beneficiaries understand the potential risks associated
with hedge fund investments, and it indirectly raises the principal-agent problems that
may occur when retail investors delegate decision-making authority to professional
fund advisers or managers. In particular, pension fund managers may have conflicts of
interest that are not well understood by the fund’s beneficiaries and that result in the
misalignment of their interests with those of the fund’s beneficiaries. For example,
fund managers may be willing to take more risk than fund beneficiaries would wish in
the hope of increasing the fund’s returns in order to increase their own compensation.
This conflict is not new and is well understood by many investors. Standard solu-
tions have been to try to structure fund-management fees in a way that aligns the
interests of fund managers and beneficiaries or to establish effective institutional
oversight and governance mechanisms to monitor fund managers. In practice, however,
these solutions seldom completely eliminate all conflicts or align the interests of fund
managers and beneficiaries.
Hedge funds are not the source of this conflict, only its latest manifestation.
Hedge funds are attractive to professional fund managers because they hold the
promise of higher risk-adjusted returns, which is especially enticing currently because
traditional asset classes like stocks and bonds are not yielding high returns. As a con-
sequence, some observers have suggested placing restrictions on the ability of pension
funds to invest in hedge funds, such as limiting the hedge fund investments of pen-
sion funds to no more than 5 percent of the fund’s assets. Blanket restrictions on hedge
investments by institutional investors, however, would be counterproductive. Any
specific limits would obviously be arbitrary and would suffer from the one-size-fits-all
shortcoming. The problem is not hedge funds but the principal-agent conflicts implicit
in delegating fund management responsibilities to professional fund managers. The
preferable way to address this problem, therefore, is to focus on solutions to that
problem, in particular how to enhance the governance of institutional investors so
that there is more effective oversight of fund managers by fund beneficiaries.
Conclusions and New Regulatory Directions
While a number of concerns have been voiced about the growth of investor interest in
hedge funds, this paper concludes that there is not a strong case for increased regula-
tory protection for hedge fund investors. An analysis of the likely costs and benefits of
such regulation suggests that the costs are likely to be greater than the benefits. Indeed,
I believe that, on a cost-benefit basis, it is difficult to make a case even for the recently
adopted Rule 203(b)(3)-2. Nonetheless, the most important conclusion of this paper is
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14. See Edwards and Gaon (2003, 8–21, table 4), who show that the correlations between stock
returns and the returns on some hedge fund strategies are often low, and Edwards and Caglayan
(2001, 97–108).
15. See Edwards and Gaon (2003, 13, table 3). If the performance of hedge funds pursuing a particular
investment strategy is measured by the average risk-adjusted returns earned by these funds (that is,
their Sharpe ratios), most hedge funds would have outperformed an investment in either the
Standard & Poors 500 stock index or the JP Morgan U.S. Bond Index during the 1990–2002 period.
16. Such restrictions also may distort the flow of investor capital, resulting in market inefficiencies and
reduced liquidity in some markets. Indeed, one explanation for the success of hedge funds is that
they have been able to exploit market inefficiencies in markets that are not mainstream markets.
Restricting the flow of capital into hedge funds therefore may perpetuate these inefficiencies.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 48 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2006
that hedge fund investment strategies should be made more, not less, accessible to a
broader spectrum of investors than at present. In particular, the SEC should consider
authorizing funds of hedge funds under a regulatory structure that better enables hedge
funds to pursue absolute-return strategies so that retail investors can benefit from them.
Part of this process would be to reexamine current mutual fund regulations. The goal of
this process should be to establish a regulatory approach that enables both mutual funds
and hedge funds to provide absolute-return investment strategies to a broader segment
of investors under a regulatory structure that adequately protects investors.
A related proposal was made in a 2003 SEC staff report, which the Commission
refers to in support of its adoption of Rule 203(b)(3)-2. In that report the SEC staff
says, “We recommend that the Commission consider issuing a Concept Release explor-
ing the wider use of hedge fund–type/absolute return strategies. . . . These invest-
ments typically have lower correlations to the broader debt and equity markets and
thus may provide benefits to investors under a wider variety of market conditions.
The staff believes that these investments may have benefits that could assist other
investors, including retail investors, in diversifying their overall portfolios. The staff
is not recommending that hedge funds be made more readily available and does not
believe that direct investment into hedge funds by retail investors is appropriate.
Instead we believe it may be the case that retail investors interested in absolute
return strategies should be able to pursue those investments through the registered
investment company structure” (SEC 2003, 103–04). 
To my knowledge, the Commission has not followed up on that recommendation.
In my view, the SEC should begin the process of evaluating the need for many of the reg-
ulations now imposed on mutual funds by the ICA (such as those pertaining to leverage,
short selling, and liquidity) and should consider developing disclosure requirements
more responsive to the absolute-return strategies now used by many investment funds.
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